## AC

I affirm.

#### First, independent of a cohesive ethical theory, each individual develops their conception of a moral obligation based on their own subjective viewpoint.

Korsgaard and O’Niell [Korsgaard, Christine M., and Onora O'Neill. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print. 124. SK]

How do we get from the fact that we find ourselves to be valuable to the conclusion that we are valuable? When we look at the argument this way, its structure seems to be like that of Mill’s argument, which proved that if there were any utilitarians, they would find their morality to be normative, and invited us to think that therefore utilitarianism is normative. By my argument, unlike Mill’s, will not fail to find its target. For Mill’s readers were not already utilitarians, or did not acknowledge themselves to be so, but you are already human beings, and do acknowledge yourself to be so. **Value**, like freedom, **is only directly accessible from within the standpoint of reflective consciousness**. And I am now talking about it externally, for I am describing **the nature of the consciousness** that **gives rise to the perception of value**. **From [the] external, third-person perspective, all we can say is that when we are in the first-person perspective we find ourselves to be valuable**, rather than simply that we are valuable. There is nothing surprising in this. Trying to see the value of humanity from the third-person perspective is like trying to see the colours someone sees by cracking open his skull. From outside, all we can say is why he sees them.”SK

#### And, all actions are based on interpretations of rules or standards. Each individual would choose a different assertion in which to terminate which means that each individual’s preference determines their will.

MacIntyre, [Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Google Books, pg. 20-21. SK]

**[A]n agent can only justify a** particular **judgment by referring to some universal rule** from which it may be logically derived, **and can only justify that rule** in turn **by deriving it from some more general rule** or principle; but on this view **since every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given**. **Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice**. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for **[T]hat will[‘s]** its principles have and **can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them**. SK

This means that all interpretations and role of the ballots are infinitely meetable as a rule or obligation has no essence as a concept because subjective individuals can define the rule as whatever they want.

#### But, if this is not true, then the interpretative part of the rule following paradox exists which yields the same conclusion.

Verheggen, [Verheggen, Claudine. "Wittgenstein's Rule‐Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning." Philosophical Investigations 26.4 (2003): 285-310. SK]

2. **The paradox**, in Wittgenstein's words, **is that 'no course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule**.' (1958, #201) The notion of a rule Wittgenstein is dealing with here is, to be sure, paradoxical. For a rule according to which everything one does can be made out to accord with it is not a rule.AsWittgenstein continues to spell this out, 'if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.' (I958, #20l) Where there is neither accord nor conflict, there is no rule-governed activity; in particular, there is no linguistic activity. For, if no application of a linguistic expresion is either correct or incorrect, then there is no such thing as meaning anything by any expression. Thus the paradox seems to have as a consequence that 'the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air', as Kriplte put it. (1982, p. 22) This truly devastating, indeed sellldefeating, conclusion can be avoided, however.All this takes is to recognize, as\X/ittgenstein imme- diately tells us, that the paradox is based on a misunderstanding, which is to think that there is no way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation. He writes: It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we one interpreta- tion after another; as if each contented us at least for a moment, until we thoufitt of yet another one standing behind it. **What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an inter- pretation**. (I958, #201) Presumably, the suggestion here is not that grasping a rule never is an interpretation - after all, an expression is sometimes understood by being interpreted, i.e., by being explained in other, familiar words - but the suggestion is that not every expression could be under- stood in this way. Now **since**, according to Wittgenstein, **the paradox lies in the idea that every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule, the suggestion is that it stems from the idea that a rule can always be interpreted in such a way that every course of action can be made out to accord**, or to conflict, **with it**, as the case may be. And **so the paradox does seem to stem from the idea that grasping a rule always is an interpretation.** This part of the diagno- sis is not disputed by the commentators I am considering. But it is only the preliminary stage of \XI'ittgenstein's diagnosis. What must be investigated next, and what is controversial, is the reason why anyone would think that grasping a rule is always an interpretation in the Is: place. What conception of a rule would have to be in play? SK

#### And, even if individuals happen to have the same standards, that still only occurs due to some agreement upon those individual standards but does not negate the idea of subjective standards.

Jones and DeMarco, [Gary E. Jones (Professor at University of San Diego) and Joseph P. DeMarco (Professor at Cleveland State University), Law and Bioethics, 2007. SK]

Let's turn to the other extreme, subjectivism; under this view, **all standards are only properly decided by each individual**. **Every standard is relative to an individual**; **you and I have the same standards only by chance, or by a common conditioning factor that leads us both to accept the same views**. Our agreement on standards gives them no additional objectivity. **All standards are up to you and me, no matter how we make our decision**. A similar background might explain why a standard is used, but a person may reject his or her upbringing and adopt a completely new set of standards. These new standards would, under subjectivism, be as good as the old, and perhaps more agreed-upon, standards. The subjectivism of the previous paragraph is an individualistic relativism, applicable to all standards. If you like out of tune, random guitar playing, then that is the proper standard of guitar playing for you. If you and I approve eating raw, rotten chicken, then that is our standard, even if we die; it is right for us. **Even an odd sense of arithmetic is proper; 2 + 2 = 5, if that accords with an individual's standard**. SK

Thus if subjectivism is true then you affirm because each individual sets their own moral obligation which means that if they perceive an injustice they have an obligation to act because injustices are defined contextual to them (ie, things that they find immoral).

#### And, this justifies why our societal interpretations of morality are constantly changing – even if we have socially mandated standards, those are expressions of subjectivity which must constantly change.

Spirkin, [Dialectical Materialism (A. Spirkin) Prev Chapter 5. “On the Human Being and Being Human.” SK]

**The group is the first shaper of the personality, and the group itself is shaped by society.** *The unity of man and society.* **A person's whole intellectual make-up bears the clear imprint of the life of society as a whole.** **All his practical activities are individual expressions of the historically formed social practice of humanity.** The implements that he uses have in their form a function evolved by a society which predetermines the ways of using them. When tackling any job, we all have to take into account what has already been achieved before us. The wealth and complexity of the individual's social content are conditioned by the diversity of his links with the social whole, the degree to which the various spheres of the life of society have been assimilated and refracted in his consciousness and activity. This is why the level of **individual development is an indicator of the level of development of society, and vice versa**. But **the individual** does not dissolve into society. He **retains his [or her]** unique and independent **individuality and makes his [or her] contribution to the social whole**: **just as society itself shapes human beings, so human beings shape society.** The individual is a link in the chain of the generations. **His affairs are regulated** not only by himself, but also **by the social standards.**SK

Regardless of accepting subjectivity or solving it, we would be unable to view morals or evaluate moral impacts and there only would be skepticism because there would be no way to determine societal values. This means that my framework precludes, as the resolution is talking about a society which means that its values are constantly changing in order to guide action.

#### Although this is true, the only way to ensure that our ethics can change and develop as according to new views of morality is through Creativity. This is the best way to have morality work with subjectivism. Creativity arises through spontaneous action in reaction to shifts in circumstances caused by natural forces. The 1AC is inherently creative as it is a shift from the status quo so vote aff – otherwise we would keep ourselves tied down to previously held conceptions of reality.

Connolly 13 writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

As individual and collective agents of multiple types, **we exercise one dimension of freedom when we pursue existing desires and another when we reflexively reconsider them** and seek outlets to act upon revised desires. But those desires are not merely given in the first instance, and the reflexive process in the second does not always render explicit what was already “implicit” in operative assumptions and desires. There is often more pluripotentiality in the rush of desire forward to consolidation in action than is captured by the lazy idea of the implicit. There is also pluripotentiality during those fecund moments when an entire constituency coalesces under new circumstances, with the change in “circumstances” often shaped by rapid shifts in nonhuman force fields with which they are involved. In such circumstances the creative element of freedom comes into play. To put the point briefly, **neither the tradition of negative freedom nor that of positive freedom comes to terms sufficiently with the role of creativity in freedom**. **Creativity** here **means**, as a first cut, **action by the present upon ambiguities arising from the past oriented toward the future in a way that is not entirely reducible to the past as either implicit in the present or an aggregation of blind causes that produce the future**. It might involve an exploratory movement back and forth between different parties in a cloudy situation that issues in a new result none intended at the start. These initiatives may then be consolidated by disciplinary processes and tactics that help to sediment them into the soft tissues of cultural life. Reflexivity, you might say, begins to do its work after the uncanny, creative element in freedom has begun to unfold, for good or ill. Creative processes flow through and over us, and reflexivity doubles the creative adventure. **Actions are thus not entirely controlled by pre-existing intentions**; rather **the creative dimension helps to compose and refine intentions as they become consolidated in action.** To articulate the creative dimension of freedom, then, is to insert a fundamental qualification or hesitation into the ideas of both the masterful agent and agency as the activation of intentions already there. The creative element is located somewhere between active and passive agency. When creative freedom is underway in an unsettled context we may find ourselves allowing or encouraging a new thought, desire, or strategy to crystallize out of the confusion and nest of proto-thoughts that precede it. An agent, individual or collective, can help to open the portals of creativity, but it cannot will that which is creative to come into being by intending the result before it arrives. Real creativity is thus tinged with uncertainty and mystery. The creative dimension of freedom discloses an ambiguity that haunts extant ideas of intention, desire, agency, and reflexivity. It exposes the ambiguity of agency in the practice of freedom. This ambiguity may find expression, say, in a basketball game as an accomplished player under intense defensive pressure spontaneously fires up the first jump shot ever attempted amid the flow of action. The shot, initially lacking a name, surprises the shooter and mystifies defenders. It was not implicit in the athlete’s repertoire; it emerged in the pressure of action. After being repeated, named, and perfected through relentless training, it may spread like wildfire across the basketball landscape, as that type of shot did in the 1950s in the United States. Everything else in the game now shifts to some degree too. Other players, coaches, and referees now adopt creative responses to it, generating changes in the game through a mélange of partisan mutual adjustments that no individual or organization intended at the outset. Or take a young point guard who spontaneously completes a fast break with a blind, behind-the-back pass and then finds himself negotiating with his coach to decide just when such passes can be allowed in the future. Such modes of creative, mutual adjustment, neither simply assignable to one player or coach, nor fitting neatly into extant notions of preformed intention, nor reducible to a reflexive dialectic, occur all the time in multiple domains. They form[s] part of the essence of freedom. Spontaneous creativity is accompanied by an element of real uncer- tainty; it occurs in that liminal moment when the limits of an activity have been experienced and before a definitive response to that limit has emerged. It thus occupies a fecund zone of indiscernibility. The result can be checked after the fact to see whether the results are positive or negative. A behind-the-back shot, for instance, might arise spontaneously in the ï¬‚ow of a game, startling the defense the first time it is enacted. It is apt, how- ever, to turn out to be too hard to perfect and too easy to defend once other teams adjust to the initial surprise. The example of the first jump shot. however, does not adequately take into account how the very context of action may sometimes change through an even more rapid shift in circumstances. To fill that bill you would need to have a setting in which a significant shift in the rules governing the game had been made, or, better, the players now find themselves in a new situa- tion in which the opponent has a roster with only seven-foot players. Cre- ative freedom, then, is spontaneous activity within a shifting setting with constraints in which an element of real uncertainty circulates through the setting. The spontaneity now ï¬‚ows through the agents and the open-ended rules of the practice, for good or ill. It operates within limits, even though those limits cannot all be stated in advance. It is unlikely. for instance. that a point guard will spontaneously ï¬‚ap his arms to ï¬‚y from the backcourt to the basket in order to dunk the ball, no matter how intense the defense is. Human arms lack the needed preadaptations to negotiate such a maneuver, even though a few players do start a dunk at the free-throw line. If **creativity finds expression in** the human estate, it will sometimes do so at surprising moments during a disruption in a practice, opening the door to a scientific invention, a new concept, a political initiative, **a new social movement**, an artistic innovation, market spontaneity, a language change, a cooking invention, teaching improvisation, a new type of film scene, a musical production, the use of new media, or the invention of a new product. And so on endlessly. **Our identification with life** – our tacit sense of belonging to a human predicament worthy of embrace – is partly rooted in reflexive reconsideration of established desires and ends. But it **is grounded** too **in** those uncanny experiences of **creativity by means of which something new enters the world.** Thismay be one of the reasons people cleave to the sweetness of life. It **[creativity] ties the sweetness of life to a vitality of being**, even more than to a preordained end, purpose, or “fullness” with which it is officially invested. **The intimate relation between freedom and creativity is why freedom is never sufficiently grasped by the idea of a lack to be fulfilled**, successful action upon preset desires, or the drive to render the implicit explicit. The experience of uncertainty or incompleteness is sometimes an occasion of fecundity.

Creative spontaneity is the only way to break free of pre-existing controls such as determinism and envision new features of ethics which are key to preserve and adapt the morals of a society, forming the constitutive nature of moral obligations.

#### The aggregation of these individual creative perspectives takes form only through some form of communication which serves to work out a shared understanding – otherwise we would only have subjective morality based on individual perceptions – these perceptions are now aggregated.

Habermas, [The inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory. Jürgen Habermas. [MIT Press](http://mitpress.mit.edu/), 1998, parts VIII and IX of Chapter 1]

I proceed on the assumption that the **participants** do not **wish to resolve** their **conflicts through** violence, or even compromise, but through **communication**. Thus their initial impulse is to **[They] engage in deliberation** and **[to] work out a shared *ethical*self-understanding** on a secular basis. But given the differentiated forms of life characteristic of pluralistic societies, such an effort is doomed to failure. The participants will soon realize that **the critical appropriation of their strong evaluations leads to competing conceptions of the good.** Let us assume that they nevertheless remain resolved to engage in deliberation and not to fall back on a mere *modus vivendi* as a substitute for the threatened moral way of life. **In the absence of** a **substantive agreement** on particular norms, **the participants must** now rely on the “neutral” fact that each of them **participate**s **in *some*communicative form of life** which is structured by linguistically mediated understanding. Since **communicative processes** and forms of life have certain structural features in common, they could ask themselves whether these features **harbor normative contents that** could **provide a basis for shared orientations**. Taking this as a clue, theories in the tradition of Hegel, Humboldt, and G. H. Mead have shown that **communicative actions** involve shared presuppositions and that communicative forms of life **are interwoven with relations of reciprocal recognition**, and to this extent, both **[and] have a normative content**. These analyses demonstrate that **morality derives** a genuine **meaning**, independent of the various conceptions of the good, **from** the form and perspectival structure of unimpaired, intersubjective **socialization.**

All moral norms must arise from the communication between individuals since the only way a norm would work is if individuals interact and talk about them. The AC framework precludes because all others presume the validity of communication. Argumentation itself presumes the necessity of communication which means that my framework is probably the best method to solve any kritik as critique can only happen through deliberation. Also means that it is a performative contradiction to deny the framework because you use communicative deliberation to do that in the first place.

Habermas 2,

This is easy to understand in an intuitive way (though any attempt to provide a formal justification would require involved discussions of the meaning and feasibility of “transcendental arguments”). Here I will limit myself to the observation that **we engage in argumentation with the intention of convincing one another of the validity claims** that proponents raise for their statements and are ready to defend against opponents. The practice of **argumentation sets in motion a**cooperative**competition for the better argument**, where the orientation to the goal of a communicatively reached agreement unites the participants from the outset. The assumption that the competition can lead to “rationally acceptable,” hence “convincing,” results is based on the rational force of arguments. Of course, what counts as a good or a bad argument can itself become a topic for discussion. Thus **the rational acceptability of a statement ultimately rests on reasons in conjunction with specific features of the process of argumentation itself.** The four most important features are: **(i)** that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; **(ii)** that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions; **(iii)** that the participants must mean what they say; and **(iv)** that communication must be freed from external and internal coercion so that the “yes” or “no” stances that participants adopt on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons. If everyone who engages in argumentation must make at least these pragmatic presuppositions, then in virtue of (i) the public character of practical discourses and the inclusion of all concerned and (ii) the equal communicative rights of all participants, only reasons that give equal weight to the interests and evaluative orientations of everybody can influence the outcome of practical discourses; and because of the absence of (iii) deception and (iv) coercion, nothing but reasons can tip the balance in favor of the acceptance of a controversial norm. Finally, on the assumption that participants reciprocally impute an orientation to communicative agreement to one another, this “uncoerced” acceptance can only occur “jointly” or collectively. Against the frequently raised objection that this justification is circular I would note that **the content of the universal presuppositions of argumentation is by no means “normative” in the moral sense.** For inclusivity only signifies that access to discourse is unrestricted; it does not imply the universality of binding norms of action. The equal distribution of **communicative freedoms** and the requirement of truthfulness in discourse **have the status of** argumentative**duties** and rights, not of moralduties and rights. So too, the absence of coercion refers to the process of argumentation itself, not to interpersonal relations outsideof this practice. These constitutive rules of the language game of argumentation govern the exchange of arguments and of “yes” or “no” responses; they have the epistemic force of enabling conditions for the justification of statements but do not have any immediatepractical effects in motivating actions and interactions outside of discourse. The point of such a justification of the moral point of view is that **the normative content of** this **epistemic language** game **is transmitted only by** a rule of argumentation to the selection of norms of action, which together with their moral validity claim provide the input into practical **discourses**. A moral obligation cannot follow from the so to speak transcendental constraint of unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation alone; rather it attaches to the specific objects of practical discourse, namely, to the norms introducedinto discourse to which the reasons mobilized in deliberation refer. I emphasize this when I specify that (U) can be rendered plausible in connection with a(weak, hence nonprejudicial) concept of normative justification.

#### The thesis of the 1AC is that banning handguns promotes communication.

**Affirm:**

**A.** Guns kill free speech – this is not saying that handguns destroy all communication but rather communication that accurately expresses one’s beliefs because it polices who can say what

Debrabander explains, [“The Freedom of an Armed Society”, Firmin Debrabander, New York Times, December 16 2012. SK]

This becomes clear if only you pry a little more deeply into the N.R.A.’s logic behind an armed society. An armed society is polite, by their thinking, precisely because guns would compel everyone to tamp down eccentric behavior, and refrain from actions that might seem threatening. The suggestion is that guns liberally interspersed throughout society would cause us all to walk gingerly — not make any sudden, unexpected moves — and watch what we say, how we act, whom we might offend. As our Constitution provides, however, liberty entails precisely the freedom to be reckless, within limits, also the freedom to insult and offend as the case may be. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld our right to experiment in offensive language and ideas, and in some cases, offensive action and speech. Such experimentation is inherent to our freedom as such. But guns by their nature do not mix with this experiment — they don’t mix with taking offense. They are combustible ingredients in assembly and speech. I often think of the armed protestor who showed up to one of the famously raucous town hall hearings on Obamacare in the summer of 2009. The media was very worked up over this man, who bore a sign that invoked a famous quote of Thomas Jefferson, accusing the president of tyranny. But no one engaged him at the protest; no one dared approach him even, for discussion or debate — though this was a town hall meeting, intended for just such purposes. Such is the effect of guns on speech — and assembly. Like it or not, they transform the bearer, and end the conversation in some fundamental way. They announce that the conversation is not completely unbounded, unfettered and free; there is or can be a limit to negotiation and debate — definitively. The very power and possibility of free speech and assembly rests on their non-violence. The power of the Occupy Wall Street movement, as well as the Arab Spring protests, stemmed precisely from their non-violent nature. This power was made evident by the ferocity of government response to the Occupy movement. Occupy protestors across the country were increasingly confronted by police in military style garb and affect. Imagine what this would have looked like had the protestors been armed: in the face of the New York Police Department assault on Zuccotti Park, there might have been armed insurrection in the streets. The non-violent nature of protest in this country ensures that it can occur.

Nonviolence is effective and better than armed revolt – empirically proven through Dr. Martin Luther King Jr and Mahatma Gandhi

Also, functions as symbolic solvency – even if guns don’t get removed the act of banning them sends a message to society for a more open conversation.

**B.** Guns create government overreaching which kills speech – aff is best way to rebel against the state

Debrabander explains, [“The Freedom of an Armed Society”, Firmin Debrabander, New York Times, December 16 2012. SK]

Gun rights advocates also argue that guns provide the ultimate insurance of our freedom, in so far as they are the final deterrent against encroaching centralized government, and an executive branch run amok with power. Any suggestion of limiting guns rights is greeted by ominous warnings that this is a move of expansive, would-be despotic government. It has been the means by which gun rights advocates withstand even the most seemingly rational gun control measures. An assault weapons ban, smaller ammunition clips for guns, longer background checks on gun purchases — these are all measures centralized government wants, they claim, in order to exert control over us, and ultimately impose its arbitrary will. I have often suspected, however, that contrary to holding centralized authority in check, broad individual gun ownership gives the powers-that-be exactly what they want. After all, a population of privately armed citizens is one that is increasingly fragmented, and vulnerable as a result. Private gun ownership invites retreat into extreme individualism — I heard numerous calls for homeschooling in the wake of the Newtown shootings — and nourishes the illusion that I can be my own police, or military, as the case may be. The N.R.A. would have each of us steeled for impending government aggression, but it goes without saying that individually armed citizens are no match for government force. The N.R.A. argues against that interpretation of the Second Amendment that privileges armed militias over individuals, and yet it seems clear that armed militias, at least in theory, would provide a superior check on autocratic government. As Michel Foucault pointed out in his detailed study of the mechanisms of power, nothing suits power so well as extreme individualism. In fact, he explains, political and corporate interests aim at nothing less than “individualization,” since it is far easier to manipulate a collection of discrete and increasingly independent individuals than a community. Guns undermine just that — community. Their pervasive, open presence would sow apprehension, suspicion, mistrust and fear, all emotions that are corrosive of community and civic cooperation. To that extent, then, guns give license to autocratic government. Our gun culture promotes a fatal slide into extreme individualism. It fosters a society of atomistic individuals, isolated before power — and one another — and in the aftermath of shootings such as at Newtown, paralyzed with fear. That is not freedom, but quite its opposite. And as the Occupy movement makes clear, also the demonstrators that precipitated regime change in Egypt and Myanmar last year, assembled masses don’t require guns to exercise and secure their freedom, and wield world-changing political force. Arendt and Foucault reveal that power does not lie in armed individuals, but in assembly — and everything conducive to that.

OW on strength of link – removing handguns key to building community which is best way to reject subjectivity grounding morality

**C.** Guns are a form of assimilation which is bad because it destroys communication for the lower group – also functions as a timeframe perm because even if banning guns is bad we’ll only know what to do after breaking out of this gun culture mentality and this idea that guns are good – means aff is net beneficial no matter what – gun ownership is regarded as an “American” right – we have to break through this assimilation which creates a binary between the “American” and the other.

Riley, [Riley, Angela R. "Indians and Guns." Geo. LJ 100 (2011): 1675. SK]

Through a different lens, **the history of Indians and guns is a story about becoming American**. In colonial America, **rights and obligations related to guns were often tied to race**, **and** race, **in turn, was tied to citizenship**. **The sovereign authority to define who was in and who was out was deployed to exclude “undesirables,”** including Indians. **But the extension of citizenship**—for Indians, the moment came officially in 1924—**marked the inclusion** of Indians **into the polity of the United States**. From here, Indians could assert rights as individual American citizens under the United States Constitution. **The “citizenship theory”** of Indians and guns, then, **is one in which** Indians may strongly adhere to the view that **gun ownership**—particularly in the defense of self, as articulated in Heller—**is a distinctly American right**. This view supports tribal claims that all citizens should be guaranteed individual gun rights, particularly in light of state failures to protect them from harm. A final, related viewpoint contemplates the history of Indians and guns as anaccount of racial hierarchy and social control, deeply pronounced at the point of contact and through the early years of the republic but tenaciously embedded in much of American law. This narrative reveals that **the relationship** of Indians and guns **developed in parallel to African-Americans and guns, with both groups situated at the bottom of a racial hierarchy that facilitated oppression**, **noncitizen status, and subjugation**. Here, **as a means of extracting wealth**—**with African slaves, their labor**; with Indians, their lands—**the gun served as a tool of white privilege**, forever **linked to a history of** violence and **oppression**. The “race theory,” then, connects guns to a complex dynamic of racial status and domination, which may, in turn, motivate contemporary tribal governments to reject a commitment to individualized gun rights.

### Underview

**First**, presume aff

A. Overcoming (a) 7463 rebuttal and double extension time skew (b) structural neg side bias (c) neg strat flexibility (d) disclosure rules (e) neg layering (f) neg’s ability to contest aff arguments more times means that I did the better debater or chose the better strategy if the round comes to a standstill and there is no offense left in the round.

And, if skep doesn’t affirm then it triggers presumption so it doesn’t negate under a truth testing model

A. Reciprocity: otherwise skep becomes a nib against the aff as I have to prove why the aff fw solves the problem and win offense to truth testing whereas the neg can do either

B. Ground – skews aff ground as all of my offense as to why JN is a good thing gets mooted – aff ground is key and outweighs - aff has to defend something in the topic whereas neg has the ability to read anything

**Second,** Anti-gun control in *contemporary* politics is based on a fear of black power – history is not as important in the context of gun control.

O’Brien **et al ‘**13**,** [O’Brien, Kerry, et al. "Racism, gun ownership and gun control: Biased attitudes in US whites may influence policy decisions." (2013): e77552. SK]

**Stronger opposition to gun control by US whites has not always been the case**. **During the civil rights movement** of the late 60 s, black activists exercised their right to carry loaded firearms in order to provide protection from police and extreme white factions [13]. The response from **US whites** was to **demand[ed] stricter gun control**. The Mulford Act was signed into law by Californian governor Ronald Reagan in 1967, and prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms in public [13]. **The social landscape has changed considerably, and most recent data indicates a quite different view on gun control by whites**, with 53% of whites wanting to protect the right to own guns, whereas only 24% of blacks do [14]. People’s stated reasons for owning guns and opposing gun-control legislation are likely complex; however, it has been suggested that **sociocultural factors such as fear of black violence may be associated with** gun ownership, and with **opposition to gun controls** [15], [16]. SK

They add:

**Objective Racism is related to policies preferences and behaviors that adversely affect blacks and appear related to a fear of blacks** (e.g., increased policing, death penalty). This study examined whether racism is also related to gun ownership and opposition to gun controls in US whites. Method The most recent data from the American National Election Study, a large representative US sample, was used to test relationships between racism, gun ownership, and opposition to gun control in US whites. Explanatory variables known to be related to gun ownership and gun control opposition (i.e., age, gender, education, income, conservatism, anti-government sentiment, southern vs. other states, political identification) were entered in logistic regression models, along with measures of racism, and the stereotype of blacks as violent. Outcome variables included; having a gun in the home, opposition to bans on handguns in the home, support for permits to carry concealed handguns. Results After accounting for all explanatory variables, **logistic regressions found that for each 1 point increase in symbolic racism** there was a 50% increase in the odds of having a gun at home. After also accounting for having a gun in the home, **there was** still **a 28% increase in support for permits to carry** concealed **handguns**, for each one point increase in symbolic racism. The relationship between symbolic racism and opposition to banning handguns in the home (OR1.27 CI 1.03,1.58) was reduced to non-significant after accounting for having a gun in the home (OR1.17 CI.94,1.46), which likely represents self-interest in retaining property (guns). Conclusions **Symbolic racism was related to having a gun in the home and opposition to gun control policies in US whites.** **The findings help explain US whites’ paradoxical attitudes towards gun ownership and gun control**. **Such attitudes may adversely influence US gun control policy debates and decisions**. SK

1. William Connolly (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University). The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Duke University Press. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)